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I. Introduction
The defeat of the Iraqi army at the end of February 1991 at the hands of the coalition
forces led by the United States was followed by widespread uprisings in Iraq against
the Government of President Saddam Hussein. There were two separate major rebel-
lions in the predominantly Shia southern provinces of Iraq and the northern Kurdish
provinces. By the end of March the Iraqi armed forces were able to crash the south-
em rebellion and to recapture a number of towns in the north from the Kurds with-
out allied interference. In late March vast numbers of Kurdish refugees fled from the
advancing Iraqi military towards the borders of Turkey and Iran. Their plight and the
problems they posed for neighbouring countries increasingly gave rise to interna-
tional concern.
On 3 April 1991, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687 setting out
the terms of a full ceasefire in the Gulf which were, albeit reluctantly, accepted by
Iraq. On 5 April 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 688 which con-
demned 'the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, includ-
ing most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten in-
ternational peace and security'.1 On 9 April 1991, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 689 in order to create a demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait. The
zone was to be monitored by a 1,440 UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)
for which all five permanent Security Council members were prepared to provide
military personnel. On 11 April 1991, the Security Council notified Iraq that a
ceasefire in the Gulf was formally in effect.2
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While the Security Council was occupied with taking these measures, interna-
tional diplomatic efforts in support of the Kurdish refugees, who were amassed under
extremely harsh conditions in the mountains in the border regions with Turkey and
Iran, concentrated on emergency relief operations and on finding solutions for an ad-
equate protection for the Kurds in Iraq itself. The idea of establishing Kurdish 'safe
havens' in northern Iraq under allied military protection was advanced. It only mate-
rialized, however, when the United States changed its position not to intervene in
Iraq and finally decided to commit troops, together with the United Kingdom,
France, and other states, to Kurdistan for humanitarian reasons; in spite of strong
objections raised by Iraq.
The following examines the legality under international law of the allied inter-
vention in Iraq during the Kurdish Crisis in 1991. In order to put the legal issues
into proper perspective, it is first necessary to try to establish the relevant factual
background in as much detail as possible, bearing in mind the scarcity and inconsis-
tency of literature and press reports.
II. Factual Background
The Kurdish population, which is estimated to amount to between 8 and 30 million
people,3 does not have an independent state but lives as a minority mainly in
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and in smaller groups in the USSR and Lebanon.4
According to recent estimates the Kurds represent between 19 and 24% of the popu-
lation of Turkey, 23 to 27% of Iraq, 10 to 16% of Iran and 8 to 9% of Syria.5 The
difficulty in establishing their precise number is due to official denial of their exis-
tence - in Turkey, they have been referred to as 'mountain turks' - and to the unreli-
ability of statistics supplied by both governments and Kurdish nationalists.
Tracing their origin back to the Medes who conquered Nineveh in 612 BC, the
Kurds assert that they are a distinct nation which has never really acquired political
Meyers Grouts Taichtnltzikon, VoL 12 (2nd. ed. 1987) 282 slates that almost half of the
Kurdish people live in the eastern put of Turkey, about a quarter in Iran, iome 20% in Iraq and
the othen in Syria and the USSR.
For an analysis of the Kurdish problem see M. Short, A. McDermoa, The Kurds (Minority
Rights Group Report No. 23,1975); G. Chaliand (ed.), PtopU Without a Country (1980); S.C
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(Minority Rights Group Report No. 23, rev. ed. 1985); H. Harnram, Autonomy. Sovereignty,
and Self-Deltrminalion. Tht Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (1986), Chapter 9 'The
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independence.6 It is more likely that the ancestors of the Kurds came from several
sources; some firom Turkic, Armenian, or Assyrian tribes, but most probably from
Indo-European groups.7 While the Kurds have a north-western Iranian linguistic ori-
gin in common, they are separated by two major dialects with considerable local
variation and a number of sub-dialects, which seems to make communication be-
tween the various tribes and regions difficult, though possible. Tribal structures
have traditionally dominated Kurdish society and continue to do so to a remarkable
extent A clear national identity began to emerge in a class of urban Kurdish intel-
lectuals in the second half of the 19th century, but tribalism as well as regional and
feudal loyalities stood in the way of its development on a broad scale. Thus, in prac-
tice, the Kurds never achieved unity in their struggle for independence against for-
eign domination, but remained always at least as much involved in fighting each
other as combatting Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian troops.8
For many centuries Kurdistan had remained a buffer region between Turkey and
Persia subject to the control of one or other of these empires. By 1639 three quarters
of the Kurds had come under Ottoman rule and in the 19th century there were re-
peated uprisings particularly against Turkey. Following the defeat of the Ottoman
Empire in World War I, the 1920 Treaty of Sevres provided not only for the creation
of the three Arab states of Hejaz (later Saudi-Arabia), Syria and Iraq, but also for an
Armenian state and a Kurdish state. In 1921 Iraq became a monarchy under the rule
of Feisal, who had been deprived of Syria by the imposition of a French mandate.
The Treaty of Sevres, however, was superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. The
latter confirmed the plan to create the three Arab states, but no longer mentioned ei-
ther Armenia or Kurdistan. It was Anglo-French collusion and rivalry in redrawing
the map of the Middle East, as well as British interest in controlling oil rich areas,
that led to the rejection of an independent Kurdistan and the artificial extension of
Iraq to include a predominantly Kurdish north.
Thus, the seeds were laid for continuous Kurdish revolts in Iraq which intensified
after southern Kurdistan - the Ottoman province or vilayet of Mosul - was awarded
by the League of Nations in 192S to the new Arab state of Iraq, and therefore in real-
ity placed under British mandate, with some guarantees for the appointment of
Kurdish officials and the use of the Kurdish language. Such pledges, however, were
not included in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty which terminated the British mandate in 1930.
After the 19S8 coup ditat against the monarchy, relations between the Kurds and
the new military government initially appeared promising on the basis of the new
constitution which referred to a partnership between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq.9
See Short, McDermott, supra note 4, at 6, i l io claiming that the 'moit famous Kurd of all
times was Saladin, who fought Richard the Lionhean and the Crusaders and regained Jerasalem
for Islam in 1187*.
Hannum, rupra note 4, at 178.
See Hippier, supra note 4, at 202-203.
Q
The following is based upon the instructive summary given by Hippier, supra note 4, at 203 -
204.
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However, the Kassem Government had developed close relations with Kurdish tribes
who were enemies of the famous Kurdish tribal leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani.
Therefore, civil strife broke out between various Kurdish groups, later followed by a
Kurdish uprising against the Baath Government In 1970 the Baath Government and
the Kurds concluded a peace agreement which reaffirmed Kurdish rights and envis-
aged the creation of an autonomous region of Kurdistan. However, the 1974 Law of
Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan announced by the Iraqi Government was refuted
by the Kurds as falling short of the peace agreement. Fighting continued with thou-
sands of Kurds fleeing to Turkey and Iran.
In the First Gulf War the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under the leadership
of Barzani's sons cooperated with Iran against Baghdad and infiltrated Iraqi territory
partly side by side with Iranian Pasdaran, while Iraq was supporting the Iranian
Kurds against Teheran in the Iranian part of Kurdistan.10 On the other hand, the pa-
triotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which had been founded under the leadership of
Jalal Talabani in the mid seventies in opposition to Barzani's KDP, offered the Iraqi
Government help against Iran and the KDP. It is reported that in the mid eighties
150,000 Kurds or more were fighting with Baghdad against Iran and the KDP, which
had to pay dearly at the end of the war for its collaboration with Teheran. In 1988
the Iraqi Army crushed the alliance of Iranian and Kurdish KDP forces ruthlessly by
using all kinds of arms available, including chemical weapons. About 5,000 civil-
ians were killed by poison gas in March 1988 in the village of Halabja.11
During the Second Gulf War, President Bush invited several times the people of
Iraq to rise against the regime,12 although this was denied by the State Department
spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler.13 Probably, this was intended to invite a military
coup against President Saddam Hussein. At any rate, in view of American interests
in the region as a whole, it did not mean support for a division of Iraq in the wake
of the Shiite insurrection in the south and a corresponding Kurdish uprising in the
north. On the contrary, the territorial integrity of defeated Iraq needed to be secured in
order to preserve Iraq's function as a balance, primarily against Iran. Although the
Islamic Republic did not say so officially, it was clear that only Iran had an interest
in a successful Shiite revolution in the south of Iraq. The establishment of an
independent Kurdistan in the north of Iraq, on the other hand, not only would have
raised the issue of control over the important oil resources in the area, but also
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would have posed a threat to the security of neighbouring States, in particular
Turkey.
There is reason to assume that this scenario and the unwillingness of the United
States to commit its military to a presence of unknown duration in a country en-
gaged in a civil war were key factors for the political decision not to go through
with the campaign against Saddam Hussein at the end of February 1991.14 The offi-
cial reason given for the suspension on 27 February 1991 of 'Operation Desert
Storm' was that the goal to push Iraq oat of Kuwait had been achieved.13 Later it
became clear that this decision allowed a large number of tanks of the Iraqi
Republican Guard to escape to the north before General Schwarzkopf was able to
complete his encirclement of the mass of Iraqi tanks assembled in the area west of
Basra.16 As a result, the Republican Guard, which had deployed almost half of its
forces in the north of Iraq, remained able to function after the war. Thus, it appears
that the domestic survival of the regime in power was preferred as a lesser evil, at
least for the time being, to the carving up of the state of Iraq.
When in mid-March of 1991 the Kurds, following the lead taken by the Shiite
rebellion in the south of Iraq, also rose in the north they were able to operate on the
basis of an alliance called the Kurdish Front which had been principally formed by
the two major Kurdish organizations, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union and Masud
Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party.17 The Kurdish pershmerga fighters, joined by
defectors from the pro-government Kurdish militia (josh), made quick advances in
the north of Iraq and gained control over the Kurdish cities Sulaymaniyah, Arbil,
Dohuk and the oil centre of Kirkuk. However, they were unable to resist counter-at-
tack by the Republican Guard, supported by combat helicopters and, according to
Kurdish sources, combat aircraft Well remembering the Iraqi use of chemical
weapons in 1988 the population of the cities fled in panic mainly towards Iran and
Turkey. It was alleged by the Kurdish leader Barzani that about 3 million Kurds had
fled into the mountains as part of a 'tactical withdrawal' to escape the government's
programme of 'genocide and torture against our people'.18
There was an urgent appeal from Kurdish leaders to France, Saudi Arabia, the
United Kingdom and the United States to seek immediate intervention by the United
Nations.19 However, by early April 1991 there was no coordinated international re-
sponse. France made an effort, but failed to persuade the UN Security Council on 2
For a similar view see Ruth], 'Der Krieg am Golf. Militirisdter Verlaaf and politisch-strate-
giscfae Problems', Europa-Archiv (8/1991) 237, 246.
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April 1991 to adopt a resolution to provide protection for the Kurds. There was op-
position from China, the USSR and the United States who shared the view that this
would create a precedent for the involvement of the Security Council in internal
matters.20 Various reasons for the refusal were put forward by the US administra-
tion, such as the unlikely success of insurgents in view of their lack of a central
command, the absence of a mandate from the United Nations extending the objective
of the operation beyond the liberation of Kuwait, and the President's reluctance to
put the lives of American soldiers at risk by becoming involved in a civil war which
had been continuing for decades.21
This attitude prevailed for some time, but eventually altered in view of the posi-
tion taken by other states and public pressure resulting from reports in the media. At
the beginning of April, Turkey,22 France23 and Iran24 sent letters in support of the
Kurds to the United Nations Security Council. Due to French persistence, the dis-
cussion finally resulted in the adoption on 5 April of Resolution 688. While the
resolution was rejected by Iraq,23 it reflected growing international condemnation of
Iraq's treatment of the Kurdish people.26
Furthermore, the idea was advanced of creating UN 'safe havens' backed by mili-
tary forces in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from further attacks by the Iraqi
Government In one form or another this idea was quickly endorsed, inter alia, by
Austria, Turkey, and European leaders attending the summit meeting of the
European Communities on 8 April 1991 in Luxembourg.27 The decision in
Luxembourg was based upon a British proposal which envisaged 'enclaves' for
Kurdish refugees on Iraqi territory close to the borders with Turkey and Iran under
the supervision and detailed management of the United Nations.28
On 8 April 1991, a White House spokesman stated that the United States had
'no position' on the question of Kurdish 'safe havens' and a State Department
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spokesman was unable to give the proposal 'specific endorsement'.29 Nevertheless,
on 11 April 1991, the President of the United States denied reports that there was a
rift between the United States and its European allies over the issue of Kurdish
'enclaves'.30 In fact, on 10 April 1991, the United States took a significant step to
protect the Kurds by requiring Iraq to cease all military activity north of the 36th
parallel. This included a part of Kurdish territory from the Turkish border up to a
line south of Mosul but excluded the oil area of Kirkuk. The United States also
warned Iraq that it would use force if there was any military interference in interna-
tional relief efforts for the Kurds.31
While the Government of Iraq dismissed the 'safe haven' plan and threatened to
prevent its implementation by all available means,32 the Kurdish leader Barzani
welcomed it as 'a big humanitarian and political step forward' and called upon all
states 'to back it and implement it as soon as possible'.33 Iran, on the other hand,
made it clear that it was unlikely to accept Kurdish 'safe havens' near its border.34
Iran also criticized the international relief effort, in particular the United Nations, for
channelling aid through Turkey without considering Iran's needs.
On 17 April 1991, armed forces of the United States and other countries began to
move into northern Iraq with the declared aim of setting up camps to secure the
safety of Kurdish refugees and of coordinating relief supplies. As stated by the
President of the United States, the intention was 'to turn over the administration of,
and security for these sites as soon as possible to the UN.'35
Iraq denounced the allied action but it did not respond militarily. It continued to
negotiate with both the United Nations Mission led by Eric Suy, Personal
Representative of the UN Secretary-General, as well as with the United Nations
Inter-Agency Mission led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the UN
Secretary-General for the United Nations Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait
and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas.36 On 18 April 1991, the Government
of Iraq and Sadruddin Aga Khan, for the United Nations, signed a Memorandum of
Understanding concerning the role of the United Nations in providing humanitarian
assistance in Iraq.37
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Under the name 'Operation Provide Comfort' the allied intervention force estab-
lished a small triangle zone at the border in the north of Iraq between Zahko,
Amadiya and Dohuk, bat excluding the city of Dohuk.38 This was declared to be a
security zone under the protection of the allied troops and non-accessible to Iraqi
forces. The Kurdish refugees were brought from the mountain slopes into this area
where they were supplied with food and tents. Many returned to their own quarters in
neighbouring cities. The occupation of almost 10,000 square km of Iraqi territory
(extending some 100 km along the Iraqi-Turkish border and some 60 km south39) by
more than 13,000 soldiers from various countries, including the United States,
Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Australia, lasted about 3
months.40 The operation guaranteed 450,000 Kurdish refugees a safe return home.
The last Turkish border camp (at Cukura) was closed on 3 June 1991.41 According
to US official figures, about 13,000 Kurds who had sought refuge in the mountains
on the Iraqi-Turkish border had died before reaching allied 'safe havens'.42
At the same time as the creation of the security zone, UN observers were dis-
patched in the whole of Iraq in critical areas, including the Kurdish cities outside of
the security zone.43 But beyond humanitarian care, the role of the United Nations in
the northern enclave remained undefined for some time.44 In May 1991, negotiations
between the United Nations and Iraq continued on the deployment of a small police
force (of about 500) in the north of Iraq to replace the allied troops.43 While the
United States and the other allies were in favour of transferring their responsibility
in the north of Iraq to such a UN contingent, Iraq at first resisted the proposal. In
mid May there were positive signs that a preliminary agreement would be reached
with Iraq, the main issues apparently concerning the size of the force and the ques-
tion whether it should be armed.46
The Kurdish city of Dohuk, a provincial capital with about 380,000 inhabitants
prior to the exodus of the Kurds, became a test of the effectiveness of the security
provided to the returning refugees by the allied presence. It was not included in the
the Secretary-General, and as an 'Enclosure', the 18 April 1991 Memorandum of
Understanding.
Hottinger, supra now 16, at 442.
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security zone and the allies used their stand-off from the city as a bargaining chip in
persuading Iraq to accept the substitution of the allied troops in the security zone by
a UN contingent On 22 May 1991, an agreement was reached.47 It provided for the
withdrawal of Iraqi military from die city and its environment and for its deployment
10 km to the south. Furthermore, Iraq consented to withdraw its special police.
Finally, the agreement permitted members of the allied forces to enter Dohuk to
help restore public facilities. The commander of the US forces in the north later ex-
plained that the accord did not signify the extension of the allies' security zone.48
When Iraq finally agreed to admit a maximum of 500 'United Nations Guards', the
UN immediately sent 10 officers from Geneva to Dohuk on 19 May 1991.49
At that time, the Kurdish part of Iraq was divided threefold. The security zone in
the north-west was occupied and controlled by about 11,000 allied soldiers. Kurdish
forces held a broad strip along the border to the east and the south, including several
towns (Halabja, Qala Diza, Ranja, Rawandiz) and, surrounded Iraqi garrisons in other
places. The remainder was under the control of the Iraqi army.50
On 29 May 1991, a US military spokesman announced that the allies would be-
gin withdrawing their troops from northern Iraq on 15 June 1991.51 However, US
troops suspended their planned withdrawal from northern Iraq on 21 June 1991 in
view of the decision by the Western allies to deploy a rapid reaction force (RRF)
based in the south of Turkey to ensure further protection of Kurdish refugees.32 The
last 3,000 soldiers of the allied forces in the security zone withdrew in mid July
1991.53 With the consent of Turkey, however, an intervention force ('Operation
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Raised Hammer*54) of about 5,000 soldiers from the United States, Britain, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey,55 remained positioned in the south of Turkey
(Silopi and two other cities) to intervene in Iraq if necessary.56 These troops left on
10 October, but some American, British and French aircraft remained at the Turkish
base of Incirlik.
III. The Legality of the Allied Intervention
From a purely moral and humanitarian point of view there seems to be little diffi-
culty in welcoming the allied military intervention in Iraq to protect the Kurdish
refugees. The assessment of the legality of the operation under international law,
however, raises more complex issues. This is due to the prohibition of the use of
force in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter which, at least accord-
ing to the prevailing view, has also become part of general unwritten international
law.57 It is also relevant in this connection that the prohibition of the use of force
overlaps with the principle of non-intervention in matters which are recognized by
international law as being solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states.58 Thus,
the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, in explaining the 'principle concerning
the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in
accordance with the Charter', clearly states that:
No State or group of States his the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the
54
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personality of the State or against it* political, economic and cultural elements, are
in violation of international law.3'
Had Iraq given its consent to the occupation of part of its territory by the allied
forces for the purpose of helping the Kurdish refugees, there would have been no le-
gal problem. But that was not the case. On the contrary, as noted in the letter dated
21 April 1991 to the UN Secretary-General transmitting the text of the
Memorandum of Understanding of 18 April between Iraq and the United Nations,
Iraq requested the United Nations, in accordance with the agreement, to assume re-
sponsibility for the relief centres established by United States and other foreign
forces in northern Iraq and noted that the allied measure would 'constitute a serious,
unjustifiable and unfounded attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Iraq*. The letter further states that:
It should be pointed out that the Government of Iraq, while opposing the steps taken
by United states forces and the foreign forces cooperating with them ... has not hin-
dered these operations because it is not opposed to the provision of humanitarian as-
sistance to Iraqi citizens who are in need of it and because it wishes to avoid any com-
plication that may prevent the return of all Iraqi citizens in security to their places of
residence.60
Leaving aside the question of whether the Government of Iraq after its military disas-
ter was actually in any position to resist the allied action, in view of the lack of
consent by Iraq to any violation of its sovereignty, the allied armed intervention re-
quires some other legal justification.
One consideration may be whether the intervention in Iraq could be based upon
support for the self-determination of the Kurds. The principle of self-determination
of people in contemporary international law is still to a large extent unclear in its
precise scope and content. It is safe to say, however, disregarding the special practice
relating to cases of decolonization, that it does not provide for the general recogni-
tion of the right of groups to secede from the states in which they reside.61 Self-de-
termination can be implemented by a sufficient degree of autonomy within the exist-
ing state structure. Indeed the Kurds in Iraq have primarily aimed for this objective,
realizing that it is unlikely that they will gain independent statehood due to the in-
terests of neighbouring states. Thus, immediately after the Republican Guard had re-
captured the Kurdish cities, Kurdish leaders decided to enter into negotiations with
59
Declaration on Principle* of International Law Concerning Friendly Relation! and Co-open-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN General
Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. UN Doc A/8028.
60
Letter dated 21 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/22513, 22 April 1991, which contains, as an
'Annex', a Letter dated 21 April 1991 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to
the Secretary-General, and as an 'Enclosure', the 18 April 1991 Memorandum of
Understanding. The quotation is from the tetter in the Annex, p. 2.
See Thurer, 'Self-determination', in R. Bemhardt (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Instalment 8 (1985) 470, 474.
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Baghdad to enable the Kurdish population to return and to prevent settlements by
Arabs in Kurdish areas.62 On 24 April 1991, Talabani announced that President
Saddam Hussein had agreed 'in principle* to grant a measure of autonomy to the
Kurds on the basis of the 1970 autonomy agreement This was confirmed by the
Iraqi Government,63 but there were difficulties as regards the implementation of the
agreement64 After four months of negotiations, in August 1991 both sides agreed
on a draft text which was submitted for approval to the various Kurdish opposition
groups.65 However, following the new outbreak of hostilities between the Kurds and
the Iraqi army in October 1991, other sources indicate that the talks on Kurdish
autonomy had made no further progress because of the failure of Saddam Hussein to
keep his promise to install a democratic government in Baghdad.66 There were later
reports from Western relief organizations that the Government of Iraq prevented the
supply of petrol and food in order to exert pressure upon the Kurds to accept the
Government's autonomy scheme.67
There are two main reasons - one legal and one factual - why the principle of
self-determination, as applied to the cause of the Kurds, does not justify the allied
armed intervention. As to the first, whatever the exact meaning of the right of self-
determination, it does not justify third-party intervention in support of secessionist
movements. In view of the central legal principles upon which the present interna-
tional system is based, including territorial integrity, sovereignty and political inde-
pendence of states, it has been correctly observed that
[a] general right to military interventions in aid of insurgents would also hardly be
compatible with the primary purpose of the United Nations to maintaining interna-
tional peace and security to which, pursuant to Article 1 of the Charter, the principle
of self-determination is subordinated.68
Hooinger, supra note 16, at 441.
6 3
 Ktesing's Record of World Events, VoL 37 (1991) 38, 126-7 (Newi Digest for April 1991).
Important points at iuoe included the size and borden of the amonomooi area, the regime to
govern the oil centre Kiikuk, foreign relations of the Kurds with regard to the Wen, and the
question of arms. Frankfurter Allgtmtin* Zeilung 2 July 1991 at 6. According to Ktesing's
Record of World Events, VoL 37 (1991) 38, 308, the conditions which emerged before the
round of ulks on 16 June 1991 were 'that Kurdiih leaden suspend links with the West and side
with the ruling Booth party against Shia insurgents and other "artificial'' organizations, in re-
turn for joint Iraqi-Kurdish administration of the oil city of Kirkuk and exclusive Kurdish con •
trol over Dohuk, Sulaimanya and Arbu".
Frankfurter Allgtmeint Zeilung 23 August 1991 at 1. There is no specific information on the
contents, except that the text would provide for far-reaching political rights and autonomy of
the Kurds and for arrangements concerning the return of the refugees. It is further mentioned
that it would not provide for complete Kurdiih control over the oil centre Kirkuk.
6 6
 Frankfurter Allgemeint Ztitung 9 October 1991 at 9.
Frankfurter Allgemtint Ztitung 4 November 1991 at 6.
Tnurer, supra note 61, at 474. In view of the uncertainties relating to the right of self-determi-
nation, ThQrer considers it premature to accept secession as 'an integral element' of that right
However, he suggests that the traditional law of intervention has undergone modification in
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As to the second, there is no indication that the purpose of the allied intervention in
Iraq was more than purely humanitarian nor did it aim to lend support to a form of
self-determination of the Kurds. This is clear both from statements made by officials
and from the temporary and limited scope of the military engagement
The question, therefore, arises whether the allied action can be justified as a case
of 'humanitarian intervention'. As distinct from military rescue operations to protect
a state's own nationals abroad - which was not at issue in 'Operation Provide
Comfort' - the concept of humanitarian intervention, in its 'classical' sense, refers
to unilateral intervention by armed force to protect the inhabitants of another state
from inhuman treatment.69 There is no need to enter into the old controversy on
whether such a right of humanitarian intervention existed in customary international
law before 1945 and whether it survived the comprehensive prohibition of the use of
force by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.70 It may suffice here
to note that authors who support a right of humanitarian intervention consider the
use of force to be legal in cases of gross violation of human rights if all peaceful
means to protect the victims have been unsuccessful, if the United Nations has
failed to help, and if the use of armed force is proportional to the goals of the rescue
mission.71 An analysis of state practice shows that recent cases of humanitarian in-
tervention are rare, and that humanitarian issues have never been the only reasons
invoked for military intervention.72 The prevailing view rejects the legality of hu-
manitarian intervention in contemporary international law mainly because of the
danger of abuse by more powerful states, which could use it as an excuse to justify
an exception to the prohibition of the use of force.73 In view of the danger of legal
uncertainty, even authors such as Frowein who have advanced the concept of obliga-
tions erga omnes, have been unwilling to admit the possibility that third states may
legally launch forcible reprisals in response to violations of human rights.74
However, the following observation by Shaw remains illuminating:
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that in some situations the international com-
munity might refrain from adopting a condemnatory stand where large numbers of
lives have been saved in circumstance* of gross oppression by a state of its citizens
that military assisunce to (overnmenu manifestly suppressing a claim to self-determination
ii no longer lawful.
69
See Beyerlin, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in R. Bernhardl (ed.). Encyclopedia of Public
International Law, Instalment 3 (1982) 211 el seq. with further references.
In addition to Beyerlin, ibid., and the literature lilted in his bibliography, see N. Ronritti,
Rescuing National* Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention and Grounds of
Hummity (1985), as well as the references in Fischer, in K. Ipsen, Vflkerrecht (3rd ed. 1990)
872 et seq.
See Verwey, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in A. Cassfte (ed.) Current Legal Regulation of the
Us* of Force (1986) 57, 74 et seq.
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 See LA. SicOianos, Les reactions dicentralisies & miiciu (1990) 475 et seq., at 485.
Fischer, in K. Ipsen, supra note 70, at 885.
See Malanczuk, 'Cooniermeasures', supra note 57, at 230 et seq with references.
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due to an outside intervention. This does not, of course, mean that it constitutes a le-
gitimate principle of international law J^
Thus, under international law armed intervention on humanitarian grounds in favour
of (foreign) inhabitants76 of other states is legal only if the UN Security Council
determines that gross violations of human rights committed by a state against its
population, or a part of it, constitute a breach of the peace (or threat to the peace)
within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter and decides upon enforcement
measures.77 This leads to the analysis of Security Council Resolution 688 con-
demning the repression of the Kurds.
The relevant draft resolution78 was put on the agenda of the Security Council on
S April 1991 by Belgium and France, joined by the United Kingdom and the United
States as sponsors.79 The meeting had been convened in response to requests by
Turkey and France. The Council also took note of letters from Iran, Iraq and
Luxembourg. At their request, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and Turkey were invited to participate in the discussion of the Council
without the right to vote.80
This draft resolution was adopted as Resolution 688 by 10 votes in favour
(Austria, Belgium, C6te d'lvoire, Ecuador, France, Romania, USSR, United King-
dom, United States, Zaire), 3 against (Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe) and 2, including
one permanent member, abstaining (China and India). The significance that was at-
tached to the issue is apparent from the fact that 31 states expressed their views on
the matter either before or after adoption of the resolution.
The text of Resolution 68881 commences with a reference to duties and respon-
sibilities of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, but then immediately recalls Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.82 It con-
tinues to express grave concern over 'the repression of the Iraqi civilian population
NLN. Shaw, International Law (3rd ed. 1991) 725. For a similar coniidentioa in the different
context of a itate liberating iu own nationals from extreme danger ice Beyerlin,
'Humanitarian Intervention', supra note 69, at 214.
This wording intends to set aside the different set of problems relating to the armed interven •
tioo in other states in protection of own nationals in serioos danger.
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 A. Verdross, B. Simma, UniwstlUs Vdlktmehl (3rd ed 1984) 291.
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 S/22448.
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 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record, S/PV 2982, 5 April 1991, 3.
Ibid., 2, 21 (Norway and Portugal), and 91 (Canada and Greece).
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 Text reproduced in 30ILM (1991) 858-859.
It provides that: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are esienliaUy within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VTL'
For an interesting view cm the relation of Article 2, paragraph 7, to general international law,
see L Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter national Law (4th ed. 1990) 294 et seq.
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in many pans of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led
to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross
border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region'.
While the preamble records that the Security Council was deeply disturbed 'by the
magnitude of the human suffering involved', it also reaffirmed 'the commitment of
all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of Iraq and of all States in the area'.
The operative part of Resolution 688 condemned in unequivocal terms 'the re-
pression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most re-
cently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international
peace and security in the region' (paragraph 1). It demanded that Iraq, 'as a contribu-
tion to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region', end the
repression immediately and expressed the hope for 'an open dialogue' to ensure 'that
the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected' (paragraph 2). After
requiring Iraq to allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations
(paragraph 3), the resolution requested the Secretary-General to pursue his humani-
tarian efforts in Iraq and 'to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further
mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population (paragraph 4)
and to 'use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United
Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced
Iraqi population' (paragraph 5). The resolution concluded by appealing to all
Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to the relief ef-
forts (paragraph 6), demanding that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General
(paragraph 7), and deciding 'to remain seized of the matter' (paragraph 8).
It has been noted that Resolution 688 has no real precedent in United Nations
practice, although there is some link to UN measures in the area of disaster relief
operations.83 While this resolution, in contrast to others adopted against Iraq, makes
no explicit reference to Chapter VII of the Charter in general or to Article 39 in
particular, it has been interpreted as evidence that the Security Council may adopt
measures under Chapter VII with regard to an internal situation if a massive viola-
tion of human rights amounts to a threat to or breach of the peace, in spite of
Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.84 A closer analysis of the statements made in
the Security Council at the occasion of the adoption of the resolution, however, re-
veals that even those states which were supporting the resolution carefully balanced
the role of the Security Council in this matter with the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of Iraq.83 There is also no indication in that discussion that the
resolution 'was understood to provide further ground for continuing economic
Heinz, Phflipp, Wolfram, *Zweiler Gollkrieg: Anwendungififl von Kipilel VTJ der UN-Chin**,
39 Vertinu NatitHun (1991) 121 et seq.. u 12S.
85
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 Ibid.
See UN Doc S/PV.2982, 5 April 1991 (Provision*]).
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sanctions',86 while it is clear that no renewed military action was mentioned in the
resolution or even contemplated in the Security Council. Therefore, the precedent
value of this resolution with regard to a more active role of the Security Council
under Chapter VII in cases of gross violation of human rights threatening interna-
tional peace should not be overestimated, although it will certainly serve as an im-
portant reference in the future for other cases. In practice, apart from the tasks as-
signed to the Secretary-General in that particular case, Resolution 688 amounted to
little more than a formal censure of Iraq. Otherwise it is most likely that it would
have been vetoed by China.87
At any rate, Resolution 688 did not endorse the military protective measures
taken by the allied forces in creating the security zone in the north of Iraq. In fact, as
Oscar Schachter correctly observes:
the Security Council was not asked to authorize or endorse the protective measures in
the safety zones, presumably because not all of the permanent members were prepared
to iuppuit them. The absence of explicit Security Council endorsement, together with
the basic Charter provision against intervention in matters essentially within domes-
tic jurisdiction, was cited by dissenting UN members as grounds for condemning the
use of troops in the safety zones as Charter violations of serious import. All states, it
was argued, had reason to fear the effect of that precedent.88
This corresponds with the rather reserved reaction of the UN Secretary-General to the
'safe havens' proposal. He immediately raised the question whether enclaves for the
Kurds could be imposed upon Iraq in disrespect of its sovereignty.89 On 17 April
1991, he further expressed the view that any plan to deploy foreign troops in north-
em Iraq would require permission by Iraq. He also noted that a UN supported police
force would need the consent of the Security Council.90 While there was no express
authorization of the deployment in May 1991 of the United Nations Guards in Iraq
by the Secretary-General, this action may be deemed as covered by paragraph 5 of
8 6
 Schachter. 'United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict1, 85 AJIL (1991) 452 et seq.. at 468.
The reluctance of China to accept the resolution became apparent from the following natement
of its representative in the Security Council:
'Mr. LI Daoyu (China) (interpretation from Chinese): We are concerned with the situation in
Iraq and the huge influx of refugees into Turkey and Inn, as described in the letters from the
Permanent Representatives of those two countries, and we wish to express sympathy for the
difficulties confronting Turkey and Iran as a result of that influx. However, this is a question of
great complexity, because the internal affairs of a country are also involved. According to
paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Charter, the Security Council should not consider or take action
on questions concerning the internal affairs of any State. As for the international aspects in •
volved in the question, we are of the view that they should be sealed through the appropriate
channel!. We support the Secretary-General in rendering humanitarian assistance to the
refugees through the relevant organizations. Based on the position I have just set out, we ab-
stained in the vote on the resolution', UN Doc S/PV.2982, 5 April 1991 (Provisional) 55-56.
Schachter, supra note 86, at 469.go
Frankfwttr Allgtmtbu Ztitwtg 10 April 1991 at 1. See also Killing's Rtcord of World
Events, VoL 37 (1991) 38, 128 (News Digest for April 1991) as to reservations by others.
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Resolution 688, requesting the Secretary-General to 'use all the resources at his dis-
posal ... to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi pop-
ulation'.91 However, it is wrong to assume that this deployment occurred without
express Iraqi agreement92 Based on discussions held on 17 and 18 May 1991, an
annex to the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the United Nations
and Iraq on 18 April 1991 laid out the details of the deployment of the United
Nations Guards Contingent It even dealt with the sensitive issue of arming the
guards in the following manner
United Nations Guards will be authorized to carry side-arms (pistols/revolvers), which
wiD be provided by the Iraqi authorities (subject to the approval of the United Nations
with respect to make, model, calibre and munitions). While it is not anticipated that
all Guards will be so armed. United Nations guidelines and practices win be followed
in this .regard.9^
Thus, in requesting individual member states to contribute to the UN deployment
the United Nations made it clear that only non-military staff could be considered due
to Iraq's view that a military presence was not acceptable.94 In June 1991, the UN
Secretary-General emphasized that the 500 UN delegates designated to operate in the
north of Iraq were not a police force, but served, as 'human witnesses', to induce the
refugees to return and convince them that they will be secure even after the with-
drawal of the allied troops from the north of Iraq.93
This underlines that the deployment of the UN guards in Iraq and the method of
providing them with small arms in the end required the consent of Iraq. Resolution
688 alone was not a sufficient basis for such a UN operation. This makes it difficult
to invoke the United Nations' involvement in the Kurdish crisis as an argument in
support of the legality of the allied military intervention to protect the refugees.
01
Schachter, supra note 86, at 469.
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 Schtchter. supra note 86, at 469, stales thit Iraq'i acceptance of the UN relief operations did
not extend to 'UN armed forces' and (in footnote S3) that the Secretary-General's action in
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Council or by Iraqi agreement'. The latter is incorrect.
9 3
 30ILM (1991) 862. (annex, para. 6).
9 4
 As was the case when the Netherlands was asked, NRC Hondtlsbiad 29 Mty 1991 at 3.
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IV. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the allied military protective action in Iraq was noble and eth-
ically sound in reducing massive human suffering, whatever its political motives
and irrespective of the question as to why such action has been lacking in many
other similar circumstances. However, the above analysis, which falls within the
traditional framework of contemporary international law, shows that it is difficult to
find a legal basis justifying the allied armed intervention in the Kurdish crisis.
Schachter has made an attempt to build a legal case in support of the action by argu-
ing, inter alia, that the Security Council had determined that there was a threat to in-
ternational peace and security, that 'the internal strife was in some respects a conse-
quence of the international military action, placing responsibility of a political and
humanitarian character on the coalition to prevent massive attacks by Iraqi forces
against non-combatants belonging to particular ethnic and religious communities',
and that the allied action was limited 'to the necessary protective action for a rela-
tively short period to allow for relief and the eventual return of the refugees' without
seeking to impose 'an internal regime of autonomy or minority rights'.96 While
these are certainly highly relevant considerations, they do not overcome the obsta-
cles posed by basic rules of international law to the unilateral (individual or collec-
tive) use of force outside the realms of self-defence within the meaning of Article 51
of the UN Charter. They would also beg the question of how to evaluate the corre-
sponding responsibility of the coalition towards the plight of the Shiites who had
rebelled in the south of Iraq.97
A discussion is required to determine if the traditional framework of international
law needs a thorough reconsideration to allow the United Nations to have an
effective role when gross violations of human rights arise and threaten international
peace and security. In view of of the USSR's well-known persistent emphasis of the
principle of non-intervention into domestic affairs of states, it is interesting to note
that then Soviet Foreign Minister, Pankin proposed recently that the United Nations
should amend the concept of sovereignty so that in future the international
community could intervene in domestic conflicts.98 Perhaps the experience of the
Schachter, supra note 86, it 469.
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Although there were new reports on the prosecution of Iraqi Shiites, on 8 Miy 1991, the
United States withdrew its remaining troops from southern Iraq, Kttiing'i Rtcord of World
Eve*U, VoL 37 (1991) 38. 211 (News Digest for May 1991). Two days later, the head of the
United Nation's Humanitarian Programme for Iraq and Kuwait, Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan,
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Fraiikfurur Allgtmtuu Zeilwig 26 September 1991 at 2. It may be noted with interest in this
connection that the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, Schevardnardse, a few months ear-
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Kurdish crisis may eventually give rise to the emergence of a new rule in customary
international law, provided it can find general acceptance as a precedent outside of the
peculiar circumstances of the Second Gulf War. It is more likely that the majority of
states, especially the less powerful ones, will resent such a development The
Kurdish crisis may also lead to a more active role for the Security Council in inci-
dents of this nature, as has been cautiously suggested by Schachter
It is unlikely that most governments would approve a broad right of the United
Nations to introduce troops for humanitarian purposes against the wishes of the gov-
ernment. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that the United Nations would
invoke chapter VII, and its mandatory authority under Articles 42 and 48, in cases of
human necessity when the territorial government is unwilling or unable to provide re-
lief and protection. (...) In a case of this kind, the Council is almost certain to
premise its decision on a finding that the situation constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security in view of its transborder implications."
The current conflict in Yugoslavia may offer a first test case for such Security
Council action. However, the legal significance of the allied intervention to protect
the Kurds for the development of international law will become apparent only in a
long-term perspective. A more immediate practical issue meriting further discussion
is how to strengthen the role of Secretary-General in dealing with the humanitarian
aspects of such cases on the basis of the experience with the Kurdish crisis.
m e n violating sovereignty, if the UN had a tay in the settlement of domestic conflict! threat-
ening the security of a region. Frankfurter AUgtmtiiu Ztiiioig 17 May 1991 at 2.
Schacnter. supra note 86, at 469.
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